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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintifl/Appellee, ] 
vs. ] 
STEVEN STEFANIAK, ] 
Defendant/Appellant. ] 
1 Court of Appeals #: 960723-CA 
> Priority #: 29(b)(2) 
III. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3(2)(e), 
1953 As Amended. 
IV. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1« Impartial Unbiased Tury Panel. Was the Defendant's right to a trial by an 
impartial jury violated? 
a. Did the trial court improperly deny the Defendant's "for cause" challenge 
of Juror Dan Ames and/or fail to adequately probe his potential bias? 
i. Standard of Review. A Motion to Dismiss a prospective juror for 
cause is within the sound discretion of the trial court. When reviewing 
such a ruling, the Court will reverse only if the trial court has abused its 
discretion. 
ii. Supporting Authorities. State vs. Woollev. 810 P.2d 440 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991); State vs. GotschalL 782 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989); State vs. 
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Dixon. 560 P.2d 318 (Utah 1977); Jenkins vs. Parrish. 627 P.2d 533 (Utah 
1981); State vs. Mian. 771 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1989); State vs. Bishop. 75 3 
P.2d 439 (Utah 1988); State vs. Brooks. 631 P.2d 878 (Utah 1981) 
("Brooks II"); State vs Brooks. 563 P.2d 799 (Utah 1977) ("Brooks D; 
State vs. Cobb. 774 P.2d 1123 (Utah 1989). 
b. Did the trial Court adequately probe the potential bias of Jurois 
Kimberly Wilson, employed by the Rich County Assessor's Office; 
Lennis Hellstrom, sister-in-law was secretary at Rich County Sheriffs Office; 
Julie Whatcott, niece of the court and county clerk; and Perry Norris, who ha I 
encountered a couple of similar situations, including a relative, tlirough his 
position as bishop? 
i. Standard of Review. See 1. a. i. above. 
ii. Supporting Authority. See 1. a. ii. above. 
c. Was defense counsel's failure to determine the nature of the Juror, 
Dan Ames, prior knowledge of the case and/or to renew his motion to dismiss 
Juror Ames for cause, ineffective assistance of counsel? 
i. Standard of Review. The claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel is a mixed question of law and fact and the reviewing court may 
review the facts. There must be a showing that trial counsel's performance 
was deficient and Defendant was prejudiced by the deficient performance. 
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ii. Supporting Authorities. State vs. Johnson. 823 P.2d 484 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991); State vs. Vigil 840 P.2d 788 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); State vs. 
Templin. 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990). 
2. Sufficiency of Evidence. Was the reliable evidence sufficient to support each 
element of the offense to the standard of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt? 
a. Standai i l ol Review. This Court must review the evidence and all 
inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to 
the verdict of the jury. The conviction may be reversed, for insufficiency of 
evidence, only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that the Defendant committed the crime. 
b. Supporting Authority. State vs. Singer. 815 P.2d 1303 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991); State vs. Petree. 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983); State vs. Vigil, supra; State vs. 
Nmbold. 581 P.2d991 (Utah 1972): State vs. Walker. 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987). 
V. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES & RULES 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution: 
[Rights of the accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained 
by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defense. 
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The Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 12: 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be 
confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel 
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury of the county or district in wliich the offense is alleged to have been 
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused 
person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure 
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence 
against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor 
a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the 
same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, 
the function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause 
exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall 
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole 
or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any 
pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate 
discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
Utah Code Annotated 76-9-702.5, Lewdness Involving Child. 
(1) A person is guilty of lewdness involving a child if the person under 
circumstances not amounting to rape of a child, object rape of a child, sodomy 
upon a child, sexual abuse of a child, or an attempt to commit any of these 
offenses, performs an act of sexual intercourse or sodomy, exposes his or her 
genitals or private parts, masturbates, engages in trespassory voyeurism, or 
performs any other act of gross lewdness, under circumstances which he or she 
should know will likely cause affront or alarm, to, on, or in the presence of 
another who is under 14 years of age. 
(2) Lewdness involving a child is a class A misdemeanor. 
Note: Statute was substantially changed after 1992. 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 18 (c)-(e): 
(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or to an individual juror. 
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(2) A challenge to an individual juror may be either peremptory or for 
cause. A challenge to an individual juror may be made only before the jury is 
sworn to try the action, except the court may, for good cause, permit it to be made 
after the juror is sworn but before any of the evidence is presented. In challenges 
for cause the rules relating to challenges to a panel and hearings thereon shall 
apply. All challenges for cause shall be taken first by the prosecution and then by 
the defense. 
(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to a juror for which no reason 
need be given. In capital cases, each side is entitled to 10 peremptory challenges. 
In other felony cases each side is entitled to four peremptory challenges. In 
misdemeanor cases, each side is entitled to three peremptory challenges. If tliere 
is more than one defendant the court may allow the defendants additional 
peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised separately or jointly. 
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror and may be 
taken on one or more of the following grounds: 
(1) want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law; 
(2) any mental or physical infirmity which renders one incapable 
of performing the duties of a juror; 
(3) consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to the person 
alleged to be injured by the offense charged, or on whose complaint the 
prosecution was instituted; 
(4) the existence of any social, legal, business, fiduciary or other 
relationship between the prospective juror and any party, witness or 
person alleged to have been victimized or injured by the defendant, which 
relationship when viewed objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds 
that the prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict 
which would be free of favoritism. A prospective juror shall not be 
disqualified solely because he is indebted to or employed by the state or 
a political subdivision thereof; 
(5) having been or being the party adverse to the defendant in a 
civil action, or having complained against or having been accused by him 
in a criminal prosecution; 
(6) having served on the grand jury which found the indictment; 
(7) having served on a trial jury which has tried another person for 
the particular offense charged; 
(8) having been one of a jury formally sworn to try the same 
charge, and whose verdict was set aside, or which was discharged without 
a verdict after the case was submitted to it; 
(9) having served as a juror in a civil action brought against the 
defendant for the act charged as an offense; 
(10) if the offense charged is punishable with death, the 
entertaining of such conscientious opinions about the death penalty as 
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would preclude the juror from voting to impose the death penalty 
following conviction regardless of the facts; 
(11) because he is or, within one year preceding, has been engaged 
or interested in carrying on any business, calling or employment, the 
carrying on of which is a violation of law, where defendant is charged with 
a like offense; 
(12) because he has been a witness, either for or against the 
defendant on the preliminary examination or before the grand jury; 
(13) having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief 
as to whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged; 
or 
(14) that a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with 
reference to the cause, or to either party, which will prevent him from 
acting impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the 
party challenging; but no person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason 
of having formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be 
submitted to such jury, founded upon public rumor, statements in public 
journals or common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the court that 
the juror can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially and 
fairly upon the matter to be submitted to him. 
VI. STATEMENT OF CASE 
1. Nature of Case. The Defendant appeals his conviction by a jury for Lewdness 
Involving a Cliild, a Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated 76-9-702.5, 
1953 As Amended, in the First Judicial District Court, in and for Rich County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable Clint S. Judkins presiding. 
2. Statement of Facts. The Appellant was convicted at his retrial after remand from 
a prior appeal, State vs. Stefaniak. 900 P.2d 1094 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), by a jury in Rich County, 
State of Utah. 
The Defendant was charged in an Information, signed by David L. Bennett1, witli 
committing a crime of Lewdness Involving a Child at Rich County, State of Utah, on or about 
1
 David L. Bennett is presently a Deputy Sheriff for Cache County. 
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July 15, 1992, in violation of Utah Code Annotated, 76-9-702.5. "The acts of the Defendant 
constituting the crime were: That tlie said Defendant exposed his genitals or private parts under 
circumstances under which he or she knew would likely cause affront or alann to, on, or in tlie 
presence of another who is under the age of 14." 
In the summer of 1992, tlie Defendant took his four (4) step children to Bear Lake for 
an outing. During the day, tlie Defendant and two (2) of the children, Cassandra Carson and 
Holly Crill floated some distance out in the lake on two (2) inner tubes. At some point, 
Holly Crill returned to shore and the Defendant and Cassandra Carson continued across tlie lake 
on the larger of the two (2) inner tubes. The state contends that tlie Defendant committed the 
criminal violation charged while on the inner tubes out in tlie lake in tlie presence of 
Cassandra Carson and Holly Crill. The state called four (4) witnesses at trial. 
Harvey Carson2, tlie father of Cassandra Carson. Mr. Carson offered no evidence 
regarding the commission of the offense charged in the Information [ Trial Transcript, page 74-
8 2 ] . 
Charlotte Crill3, mother of the four (4) step children and former wife of tlie Defendant. 
Ms. Crill offered no evidence regarding the commission of tlie offense. [Trial Transcript, page 82-
93]. 
The other two (2) witnesses were Cassandra Carson and Holly Crill. A detailed discussion 
of their testimony will take place as part of the argument regarding sufficiency of the evidence. 
2Harvey Carson essentially testified to the age of his daughter and identified certain 
pictures of the four (4) step children. 
3The testimony of Ms. Crill was essentially similar to Mr. Carson's, identifying certain 
photo exhibits and establishing the age of the four (4) step children. 
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The charges against tlie Defendant were tried to a jury on April 1, 1996. After his Motion 
to Continue was denied, tlie Defendant elected not to remain for tlie trial and tlie trial was held 
in his absence. 
VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Defendant was denied his right to a trial by an "impartial jury". 
a. The Court improperly denied tlie Defendant's "for cause" challenge of 
Juror Dan Ames and failed to adequately probe his potential bias. It is prejudicial 
error to compel a party to exercise a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective 
juror who should have been removed for cause. 
b. The trial court failed to adequately probe potential bias of jurors 
Kimberly Wilson, Lennis Hellstrom, Julie Whatcott, and Perry Norris. Responses 
of said jurors established facts in relation to their employment, family 
connections, and other facts which suggested a possible bias in favor of the 
prosecution. 
c. Failure of tlie Defendant's counsel to determine tlie nature of tlie Juror, 
Dan Ames, prior knowledge of the case and to renew his motion to dismiss Juror 
Ames "for cause" was "ineffective assistance of counsel". 
2. The evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish, to a standard of 
"beyond a reasonable doubt", that tlie offense charged took place "on or about July 15, 1992", 
and that the offense alleged took place "in Rich County, State of Utah". 
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VIII. ARGUMENT 
1. Trial by Impartial luiy. Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution and the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Contitution guarantees the Defendant the right to a trial 
by an "impartial jury", State vs. Bishop supra. The trial court's failure to dismiss certain jurors for 
cause denied the Defendant his right to trial by an impartial jury. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 18(e) implements the constitutional mandate and offers guidance as to when a juror should 
be removed for cause, State vs. Woollev supra. Rule 18 (e)(14) states; 
The challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror and may be 
taken on one or more of the following grounds: 
(14) that a state of mind exists on the part of a juror with reference to the cause, 
or to either party, which will prevent him from acting impartially and without 
prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challenging; but no person shall be 
disqualified as a juror by reason of having formed or expressed an opinion upon 
the matter or cause to be submitted to such jury, founded upon public rumor, 
statements in public journals or common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to 
the court that the juror can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act 
impartially and fairly upon the matter to be submitted to him. 
This Court, in State vs. Woollev supra, has held that "it is prejudicial error to compel a 
party to exercise a peremtory challenge to remove a prospective juror who should have been 
removed for cause". See also: State vs. Julian supra, State vs. Brooks (Brooks I) supra, State vs. 
Brooks (Brooks II) supra. 
a. Failure to Remove luror Dan Ames for Cause. Juror Dan Ames was the 
Director of Emergency Management for Rich County and the State Fire Warden 
[Trial Transcript, page 29, lines 23-24]. His wife, Debra, was the Rich County 
Recorder [Trial Transcript, page 29, lines 24-25]. Juror Ames also acknowledged 
having prior knowledge of the case [Trial Transcript, page 33 , lines 16-21]. The 
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trial court asked Juror Ames a general question regarding his ability to set aside 
what he had heard [Trial Transcript, page 33, line 23 - page 34, line 3] . Mr. 
Ames answer was "I think so." The trial court did not inquire of Juror Ames what 
his knowledge was. Defense counsel inquired of Juror Ames if he had formed an 
opinion. Juror Ames answered "I don't know. Maybe." [Trial Transcript, page 
37, lines 20-23]. Defense counsel further questioned Juror Ames whether he had 
formed an opinion based on the prior knowledge and received an equivocal answer 
aI don't think so." [Trial Transcript, page 38, line 6] . At that point, defense 
counsel requested that the trial court excuse Juror Ames for cause. The trial court 
made a further inquiry [Trial Transcript, page 38, line 15-24] and Juror Ames 
gave another equivocal answer "I don't think it would affect me." At this point the 
trial court denied the motion to excuse Juror Ames for cause [Trial Transcript, 
page 39, lines 1-2]. After denial of the motion, defense counsel made further 
inquiry and in response to a question Mr. Ames acknowledged that in his job he 
worked with the county sheriffs office [Trial Transcript, page 39, lines 21-24]. 
The trial court in questioning Juror Ames regarding his prior knowledge 
failed to determine what the jurors prior knowledge of the case was. In fact the 
trial court said, "Mr. Ames, you raised your hand. I don't want you tell me what 
you know about the case, but you've heard about this case, is that correct?" [Trial 
Transcript, page 33, lines 19-21]. In this case the Defendant had been 
previously convicted by a jury in Rich County and the conviction had been 
reversed by this Court, State vs. Stefaniak supra. It is hard to believe that if Juror 
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Ames had knowledge of the prior conviction, it would not be pre judical to the 
Defendant Failure to determine what Juror Ames prior knowledge was clearly left 
the possibility that he had prior knowledge of the previous conviction. 
Although the decision to dismiss a prospective juror for cause is within the 
sound discretion of the trial court, considering Dan Ames close relationship to 
Rich County through employment, his spouse, and the fact he worked so closely 
with the sheriffs office, and the fact that his responses to all of the questions 
regarding his possible bias were equivocal; the trial court should have removed 
him for cause, State vs. Woollev supra, State vs. Parrish supra, State vs. Gotschall 
supra. The fact that he may have already formed an opinion and the fact that 
there was a total failure to determine what his prior knowledge was, even though 
that prior knowledge may have been critical, if his prior knowledge was that there 
had been a prior conviction which had been reversed, all add up to an abuse of 
discretion by the trial court. As stated in State vs. Woollev supra: 
Accordingly, trial courts must adequately 
probe a jurorfs potential bias when that juror's 
responses or other facts suggest a bias. The court's 
discretion is properly exercised when deciding 
whether to dismiss a juror for cause only after this 
investigation takes place. 
State vs. Woollev supra, further states, "It is prejudicial error to compel a party to 
exercise a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror who should have 
been removed for cause." and compels reversal as a result of the trial court's 
failure to remove Dan Ames from the jury panel for cause. See also: State vs. 
Gotschall. 
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b. Failure to Ensure an Impartial Tury Panel. The Supreme Court of tiie 
State of Utah has emphasized that "it is [the trial judge's] duty to see that the 
constitutional right of an accused to an impartial jury is safeguarded", State vs. 
Woollev supra, State vs. Dixon supra. And imposed upon die trial court the duty 
to "probe a juror's potential bias when that juror's responses or otlier facts suggest 
a bias. The court's discretion is properly exercised when deciding whetlier to 
dismiss a juror for cause only after this investigation takes place.", State vs. Woollcv 
supra, State vs. Cobb supra. 
Facts surrounding several of the jurors on the jury panel presented a 
question of possible bias in favor of the prosecution. Jurors which should have 
been probed by the court in further detail are: 
Juror Kimberly Wilson worked for the Rich County Assessor's Office 
[Trial Transcript, page 29, line 17-18]. Mrs. Wilson also acknowledged that she, 
as part of her work for the Assessor's Office, worked around most of the Sheriffs 
Office personnel, Mr. Preston, and the court staff on a daily basis. Her response 
to the defense counsel's question to whetlier she may have a tendency to support 
the state's case was equivocal "I don't think so. No." [Trial Transcript, page 40, 
lines 8-18]. 
Juror Lennis Hellstrom's sister-in-law worked as a secretary with the 
sheriffs office [Trial Transcript, page 39, lines 12-13]. 
Juror Julie Whatcott was the niece of the court and county clerk, 
Becky Peart. [Trial Transcript, page 41, lines 9-10]. 
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Juror Peny Norris acknowledged that in connection with his duties as a 
bishop "I had — IVe been involved -- I served as a bishop and I was involved in a 
couple of different cases with youth that exposed me to situations like this." [Trial 
I 
Transcript, page 56, lines 10-13]; and further, that one of those situations was a 
family member [Trial Transcript, page 56, line 21]. 
c. Failure to Determine Juror Ames Prior Knowledge and Renew 
Objection. In the event that this Court determines that failure of Defendant's 
I 
counsel to determine the nature of Juror Ames prior knowledge of the case and/or 
to renew his motion to dimiss Juror Ames for cause was a waiver, or that the 
Defendant may not challenge the trial court's failure to remove said juror for cause 
at this stage of the proceedings, then defense counsel's failures were ineffective 
assistance of counsel. In order to establish that the Defendant has been denied 
! 
his Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel, the Defendant must meet a 
two (2) part test. State vs. Templin supra stated, 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's 
performance was deficient. This requires showing 
that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was 
not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the 
defendant must show that the deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that 
counsel's error were so serious as to deprive the 
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is 
reliable. 
See also: State vs. Johnson supra, State vs. Vigil supra. 
It is the Defendant's position, as pointed out above, that failure to dismiss 
i i 
Juror Ames for cause resulted in denial of the Defendant's constitutional right to 
13 
a trial before an impartial jury. Denial of a constitutional right so fundamental 
as the right to a trial before an impartial jury is in and of itself prejudicial to the 
Defendant. If defense counsel's actions resulted in the denial of such a 
fundamental constitutional right it is clearly ineffective assistance of counsel.4 
2. Evidence Insufficient to Support Conviction. The standard of review which 
this Court must apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence on which the Defendant was 
convicted was stated by the Utah Supreme Court in State vs. Petree supra as follows: 
. . . we review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn 
from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury. We reverse a jury 
conviction for insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of 
which he was convicted. 
See also: State vs. Singer supra, State vs. Vigil supra, State vs. Newbold supra, State vs. Walker supia. 
In this case two (2) elements of the offense were not supported by sufficient evidence «o 
establish the Defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; 1) that the offense occurred on < >r 
about July 15, 1992, and 2) that the offense occurred in Rich County, State of Utah. 
a. Date of Offense. The only evidence to establish that date of the offence 
was the testimony of Cassandra Carson [Trial Transcript, page 95, lines 3-8] as 
follows: 
Q. Do you recall an incident in about July of 1992 in which you 
came to Bear Lake with Steve? 
A. Yes. 
4It is the Defendant's position that the trial court had an obligation to further question 
Juror Ames and to dismiss Juror Ames for cause without any further action on the part of 
defense counsel. Therefor, denial of the Defendant's right to trial by an impartial jury was 
the fault of the trial court. 
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Q. And can you fix a date on that? 
A. It was - - I don't exactly remember the date, but I remember it 
was in the summer, around July. 
The only fair conclusion to be drawn from that testimony is that the 
witness did not remember the date, but only remembered that it was during tlie 
summer. The incident could have been in June, July or August or perhaps later. 
The Defendant was charged with having committed tlie offense "on or 
about July 15, 1992w [See Information]. The jury was instructed that die 
Defendant was charged with having committed tlie offense "on or about July 15, 
1992" [Trial Transcript, page 139, line 11 - page 140, line 7]. The jury was 
instructed in instruction no. 2 that; 
Before you find tlie defendant guilty of tlie crime of 
lewdness involving a child you must find from tlie evidence, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, all of tlie following elements of that 
crime... . And number three, that the said act of the defendant occurred 
on or about July 15 of 1992 (emphasis added). 
[Trial Transcript, page 140, lines 8-12 and 18-20]. 
The Defendant was not charged with having committed tlie offense during 
the summer of 1992 or during June, July, or August of 19925. The jury was not 
free to disregard the specific date and convict so long as tlie offense only occurred 
during tlie summer or perhaps June, July, or August of 1992. The jury disregarded 
this element. 
I 5The State could have elected to charge tlie offense as having been committed during 
the summer and/or in June, July, or August, but elected not to do so. Instead, the State 
elected to establish a specific date upon which tlie defendant was entitled to rely. 
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b. Location of Offense. The only reliable evidence regarding the location 
of the acts constituting the offense, is that they occurred at Bear Lake. It is 
common knowledge that Bear Lake is partially in the State of Utah and partially 
in the State of Idaho. That portion of the lake located in the State of Utah is 
located in Rich County. There was no evidence presented at trial establisliing the 
location on the lake where the acts constiuting the offense took place. Further, 
there is no evidence establisliing the boundary line between Utah and Idaho. 
Apparently, the prosecution's questions regarding whether the Defendant 
turned right or left when he arrived at Bear Lake were intended to establish 
whether he was in Utah or Idaho. The record contains no evidence to establish 
the location of the Utah-Idaho boundary. The evidence is insufficient to establish 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant turned right or if he did turn right, 
that he went a sufficient distance south to ensure that he was in Utah. 
The evidence presented regarding the direction of travel when the 
Defendant and the children arrived at Bear Lake was through the testimony of 
Cassandra Carson and Holly Crill. 
Cassandra testified as follows: 
Q. Okay. Do you remember coming to an intersection, coming 
down a canyon, to an intersection? 
A. I remember seeing a yogurt stand, a raspberry yogurt stand; and 
a tombstone with some wood carved in it. 
Q. Okay. And then from that place where did you go? Did you 
go to a public beach? 
A. Where we swam at, yeah. 
Q. Okay. Do you remember whether you turned right or left at 
that intersection? 
A. I'm not sure, but I think we might have turned right. 
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Q. And how far did you go after you turned right, how far did you 
go south? 
A. We went all the way around the tliingy until we were going to 
where we were going. 
Q. To a public beach? 
A. There wasn't any people around. 
[Trial Transcript, page 95, line 22 - page 96, line 15] 
The only fair inference from that testimony is that the witness did not 
recall whether they turned right or left and that they may have turned right. The 
inference must be drawn that they also may have turned left. The prosecutor's 
statement [Trial Transcript, page 96, line 10-11] was a misstatement of the 
evidence and clearly intended to lead the witness into establishing the direction 
of travel. The witness did not take the lead. 
The direction of travel was later discussed with the witness 
Cassandra Carson as follows: 
A. Wait. Yeah, we filled them up at the service station by the 
yogurt station. 
Q. Okay. 
A. They were filled up when we got to the beach. 
Q. So you filled up the inner tubes and then you turned right at 
the service station and went to a beach, is that correct? 
A. I'm sure, but I'm not sure about the right, but the way I 
remember tilings I'm pretty sure it was right, but I'm not all the 
way sure. 
[Trial Transcript, page 97, line 19 - page 98, line 3] 
Even though the proscutor attempted to lead the child witness, she clearly 
did not remember the direction of travel and stated so. 
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The only other testimony regarding the direction of travel was offered by 
Holly Crill as follows: 
Q. And where did you go? 
A. Bear Lake. 
Q. Do you remember a Texaco service station as you came into the 
Bear Lake area, or a service station? 
A. A service station. 
Q. And what did you do at the service station? 
A. I can't remember. 
Q. Do you remember putting any air in the inner tubes? 
A. I think that's — in the big inner tube, I think. (Inaudible.) 
Q. When you got to the service station which way did you turn, 
right or left? 
A. I think it was right. 
Q. I think he's trying to tell you to speak up a little louder, maybe. 
And so then where did you go after you turned at the service 
station? 
A. To Bear Lake. 
Q. And who went down to the lake? How many of you went to the 
lake? 
A. There was me, Steve, Headier, Cassie and Shawn. 
[Trial Transcript, page 121, line 13 - page 122, line 11] 
This witness' testimony regarding the direction of travel is equivocal. The 
only fair inference from the testimony is that Holly Crill had no clear recollection 
of the direction of travel, but she thinks it was right. 
Considering the evidence, not the prosecutor's statements, the direction 
of travel after reacliing Bear Lake was not established beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Whether the acts constituting the offense took place in the State of Utah or the 
State of Idaho is not supported by evidence in the record. 
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The jury was instructed in instruction no. 1 that the acts constituting the 
offense took place in Rich County, State of Utah, and the jury was further 
instructed in instruction no. 2 that; 
Before you find the defendant guilty of the crime of 
lewdness involving a child you must find from the evidence, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following elements of that 
crime. . . . And number three, that the said act of the defendant did 
occur in Rich County, State of Utah, (emphasis added). 
[Trial Transcript, page 140, lines 8-12 and 17-18], 
The jury apparently either disregarded that instruction or relied upon 
evidence or information not presented at trial. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, this Court should find that the Defendant did not receive a trial by an 
impartial jury. That the trial court improperly failed to dismiss Juror Dan Ames for cause and 
failed to adequately probe potential bias of various jury members to ensure that the Defendant 
would receive a trial by an impartial jury. 
Second, that defense counsel's failure to determine the nature of Juror Dan Ames prior 
knowledge of the case and to renew the motion to dismiss Juror Ames for cause was ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
Third, that the evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the acts 
constituting the offense took place on or about July 15, 1992, and/or that it occurred in Rich 
County, State of Utah. 
WHEREFORE, the Defendant requests this Court reverse his conviction and dismiss the 
case against him. 
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